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Casenote

Taking a Bite Out of Speech Regulation: The
Supreme Court Upholds First Amendment
Protection for Depictions of Animal Cruelty
in United States v. Stevens

I.

INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment' is tested most strenuously when called upon
to protect expression that many people would find indefensible. This
occurred in United States v. Stevens2 when the Supreme Court of the
United States refused to categorically remove depictions of animal
cruelty from the bulwark of free speech.' Further, the Court invalidated

1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The amendment states as follows: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
2. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
3. Id. at 1586.
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section 48 of Title 18 of the United States Code," which prohibited the
creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty,' as unconstiBy not allowing speech to be categorically
tutionally overbroad.'
excluded from First Amendment protection because of its inherent lack
of value, the Court revealed an increasingly libertarian approach to
speech regulation.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Robert Stevens is a pit bull enthusiast. From his rural Virginia home,
the 68-year-old ran Dogs of Velvet and Steel, a business that sold
informational material and equipment on the care and handling of pit
bulls.' Among the items he sold were films he produced about the

breed, including Catch Dogs and Country Living, Pick-A-Winna: A Pit
Bull Documentary, and Japan Pit Fights.8 Footage from Catch Dogs
shows the dogs being trained to catch wild boar and includes gruesome
shots of a pit bull attacking a domestic farm pig.' In Pick-A-Winna,
Stevens compiled portions of footage shot by others that show modern

4. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006), declared unconstitutionalby United States v. Stevens, 130 S.
Ct. 1577 (2010). The statute read as follows:
(a) CREATION, SALE, OR POSSESSION.-Whoever knowingly creates, sells, or
possesses a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that depiction
in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
(b) EXCEPTION.-Subsection (a) does not apply to any depiction that has serious
religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.
(c) DEFINITIONS.-In this section(1) the term "depiction of animal cruelty" means any visual or auditory
depiction, including any photograph, motion-picture film, video recording,
electronic image, or sound recording of conduct in which a living animal is
intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed, if such conduct is
illegal under Federal law or the law of the State in which the creation, sale, or
possession takes place, regardless of whether the maiming, mutilation, torture,
wounding, or killing took place in the State; and
(2) the term "State" means each of the several States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American
Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.
Id.
5. Id. § 48(a).
6. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
7. Brief for Respondent at 2, United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (No. 08769), 2009 WL 2191081.
8. Id. at 3-5.
9. United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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day pit bull fights in Japan as well as United States dog fights from the
1960s and 70s. JapanPit Fightsfeatures additional fights that Stevens
documented in Japan.'o In each video, Stevens, who also authored a
book on pit bulls," offers commentary about the onscreen action. 12
Federal authorities bought copies of the films from Stevens in 2003
after he advertised them for sale in Sporting Dog Journal, an underground publication featuring articles on illegal dog fighting." Based
on this evidence, a federal grand jury in the Western District of
The grand jury
Pennsylvania indicted Stevens in March 2004.u1
charged him with three counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 48's by "knowingly selling depictions of animal cruelty with the intention of placing
those depictions in interstate commerce. "16 Stevens sought dismissal
of the indictment, arguing that under the First Amendment" the
federal statute was facially invalid."8 The district court denied his
motion, likening depictions of animal cruelty to obscenity or child
pornography, and held that such depictions were categorically exempt
Stevens was subsequently
from First Amendment protection.19
convicted on all charges in January 2005 and sentenced to three
concurrent sentences of thirty-seven months imprisonment and three
years supervised release.20
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
sitting en banc, ruled § 48 unconstitutional on its face and vacated
Stevens's sentence in July 2008.21 The court did not recognize depictions of animal cruelty as a new category of unprotected speech, refusing
the Government's attempt to equate such depictions to child pornography.22 The Supreme Court granted the Government's petition for writ
of certiorari 23 and in April 2010 affirmed the Third Circuit's ruling.'

10. Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 4-5.
11. BOB STEVENS, DOGS OF VELVET AND STEEL: PIT BULLDOGS: A MANUAL FOR OWNERS
(1983).
12. Stevens, 533 F.3d at 221.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006), declared unconstitutional by United States v. Stevens, 130
S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
16. Stevens, 533 F.3d at 221.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Stevens, 533 F.3d at 235.
22. Id. at 224.
23. United States v. Stevens, 129 S. Ct. 1984 (2009).
24. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. History of 18 U.S.C. § 48
In 1999 Congress passed and President Clinton signed into law 18
U.S.C. § 48,25 prohibiting the creation, sale, or possession of a depiction
of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that depiction into
interstate or foreign commerce.2 6 Dog fighting, however, was not at the
forefront of legislators' minds when they wrote the statute. Rather,
lawmakers were more intent on shutting down the growing market for
crush videos, which are short films that show women crushing small
animals to death, either with their bare feet or while wearing highheeled shoes and speaking in a dominatrix fashion." The films,
designed to satiate a peculiar sexual fetish, were commonly available on
the Internet and could be made to order. Yet despite their ubiquity,
existing animal cruelty laws made it difficult to prosecute the filmmakers. Participants, shooting locations, and dates when animals were
killed often could not be identified, enabling the accused to raise
jurisdictional and statute of limitations defenses. With § 48, elected
officials chose to target the market for crush videos rather than the
underlying activity. The idea was to eliminate the films' profitability,
thus defeating the desire for such behavior in the first place."

B. Relevant Case Law
Congress can make no law that abridges the freedom of speech.'
This means that generally, the government may not restrict expression
based on its message, ideas, subject matter, or content.o Even though
this protection is extensive, it is not absolute. Certain narrowly defined
speech categories are exempt from absolute First Amendment protection
and are subject to content regulation."
These categories include

25. See Act of Dec. 9, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-152, 113 Stat. 1732.
26. Id.
27. H.R. REP. No. 106-397, at 2 (1999). These women usually kill mice, hamsters, or
other small animals, though occasionally they stomp to death dogs, cats, and even
monkeys. Id.
28. Id. at 2-3.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Am.
Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)).
31. Id.
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obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal
conduct.32 Of potential import to Stevens is case law related to
obscenity and speech that is integral to criminal conduct.
1. Free Speech and Obscenity. Obscenity occupies a special place
in First Amendment jurisprudence. Unlike other categories of speech
that are proscribed for fear of some consequential harm, obscenity is
outlawed purely because its content is offensive. For speech to be so
offensive that it is obscene, the speech must be sexual in nature and
In Roth v. United
appeal to an individual's prurient interest.'
unworthy of First
obscenity
declared
first
Court
Supreme
States, the
Amendment protection." The defendant sold books, photographs, and
magazines, using circulars and advertising media to solicit sales."
New York authorities deemed these materials "obscene" and in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1461,38 which prohibits the mailing of such items.39
The Court held that obscene material does not merely portray sex but
"deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest;" obscene
material incites "itching, morbid, or lascivious longings. 4 o Obscenity
exists, the Court concluded, when the average person applying contemporary community standards feels that the dominant theme of the
material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest.4 1
The Court reframed this definition less than twenty years later in
Miller v. California4 1 when it established the current view of obscenity.

32. Id. (citations omitted).
33. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d
251, 262 (3d Cir. 2001); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 574-75
(7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Moore, 215 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2000).
34. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24 (citation omitted) ("[S]tatutes designed to regulate
obscene materials must be carefully limited. As a result, we .. . confine the permissible
scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct."); A Book Named
"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Att'y Gen., 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966)
("[It must be established that ... the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to a prurient interest in sex. . . ."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,487 (1957)
("Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest.").
35. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
36. Id. at 485.
37. Id. at 480.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1461(2006) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645,62 Stat.
768). The Court applied the original version of the statue, ignoring the 1955 amendment.
Roth, 354 U.S. at 479 n.1.
39. Roth, 354 U.S. at 479 n.1, 480.
40. Id. at 487 & n.20.
41. Id. at 489.
42. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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Miller mailed brochures that advertised the sale of "adult material" to
an unsuspecting recipient.43 The brochures depicted men and women
enjoying group sex and prominently displayed their genitals." This
violated the California Penal Code." The Court decided that obscenity
exists under the Roth standard only when the work is "patently
offensive" and lacks "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value." 6 Further, the Court said there are no national, uniform
standards for deciding what is prurient or patently offensive; individual
communities must figure it out on their own based on local values."
Notably, though the plain meaning of "patently offensive" could describe
many types of speech, the Court intended that it apply only to material
of a sexual nature."'
In recent years there have been various efforts to stretch obscenity to
include not just sex-related speech but also speech that depicts violence.
These efforts have failed, at least at the appellate level. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in declaring unconstitutional a Missouri statute that prohibited the rental or sale of violent
movies to minors, held that obscenity only includes expressions of a
sexual nature, and that material containing violence, but not sex, is not
obscene." The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
refused to recognize as obscene trading cards that depict "heinous
crime."o The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
would not expand its obscenity jurisprudence to include violent rather
than sexually explicit content in video games, movies, and Internet
websites." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
declared that obscene speech and speech that conveys violence "are

43. Id. at 16-18 (internal quotation marks omitted). The brochures served as
promotional material for a film, Marital Intercourse, and four books, Intercourse, ManWoman, Sex OrgiesIllustrated, and An IllustratedHistory of Pornography. Id. at 18.
44. Id. at 18.
45. Id. at 16. The court applied the original version of the code, which made it a
misdemeanor to knowingly distribute obscene matter, because Miller committed the alleged
offense prior to the code's June 25, 1969 amendment. Id. at 16 n.1.
46. Id. at 24.
47. Id. at 30.
48. See id. at 24. Consider further the Court's language in defining what a legislature
may permissibly regulate as obscene: "[platently offensive representations or descriptions
of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated" or "[p]atently offensive
representation or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of
the genitals." Id at 25.
49. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1992).
50. Eclipse Enters., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63, 64, 67 (2d Cir. 1997).
51. James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 687, 698 (6th Cir. 2002).

20111

UNITED STATES V. STEVENS

1037

distinct categories of objectionable depiction." 2 Thus, the court
concluded that the exclusion of obscenity from First Amendment
protection neither compels nor forecloses the same treatment of
violence." Judge Richard A. Posner, authoring the opinion, pondered
how violent material might fit into obscenity:
Maybe violent photographs of a person being drawn and quartered
could be suppressed as disgusting, embarrassing, degrading, or
disturbing without proof that they were likely to cause any of the
viewers to commit a violent act. They might even be described as
"obscene," in the same way that photographs of people defecating might
be .. . included within the legal category of the obscene, even if they
have nothing to do with sex. In common speech, indeed, "obscene" is
often just a synonym for repulsive, with no sexual overtones at all.'
The Supreme Court weighed in next: Less than a week after the Court's
April 20, 2010 decision in Stevens, the Court agreed to hear Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n," in which the state of
California argued that it may regulate as obscene the sale of violent
video games to children.5 6 The Court heard oral arguments in the case
on November 2, 2010.57

52. Am. Amusement Mach., 244 F.3d at 574.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 575 (citations omitted).
55. 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010).
56. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 957-58 (9th Cir.
2009). California derives its argument from Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
In Ginsberg, the Supreme Court announced a so-called "variable obscenity" standard,
Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 953, by allowing the government to regulate sexually-explicit
material as obscene when sold to children, even though the material was not obscene for
adults. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 632-35, 637. The Court chose not to subject the New York
statute to strict scrutiny because it supported parents' constitutional right to direct the
upbringing of their children and because of the state's independent interest in the wellbeing of its youth. Id. at 639-40. California seeks to apply this justification to the
regulation of violent content. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 958.
57. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.
aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/08-1448.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2011) (Docket No. 08-1448,
entry of Nov. 2, 2010). During oral arguments, the justices agreed that to rule in favor of
California would require them to expand obscenity to encompass expressions of violence.
Adam Liptak, JusticesDebate Video Game Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/03scotus.htmL. Interestingly, ChiefJustice Roberts, joining justices
Stephen G. Breyer and Samuel A. Alito, Jr. was among the three who seemed most
interested in trying to save the statute. Id. Meanwhile, Justice Antonin Scalia provided
vocal opposition, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor asked whether the Court could reconcile
with Stevens a decision that allowed California to regulate depictions of violence: "How is
this any different ... than what we said we don't do in the First Amendment field in
Stevens, where we said we don't look at a category of speech and decide that some of it has
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2. Free Speech and Underlying Criminal Activity: Child
Pornography. In other contexts, such as child pornography, the
Supreme Court has specifically rejected the use of obscenity and
deployed different theories of speech regulation. Accordingly, in New
York v. Ferber,ss the Court recognized that child pornography may pass
Miller's obscenity test, but the Court held for the first time that such
material does not deserve First Amendment protection because
producing the pornography requires child abuse.59 The Court's decision
addressed a section of Article 263 of the New York Penal Law60 that
prohibits using a child in a sexual performance.e" Bookstore proprietor
Paul Ferber challenged the statute after he was arrested for selling to
an undercover cop two films of young boys masturbating. 2 In upholding the law, the Court ruled that the government had a compelling
interest in protecting the physical and psychological welfare of children,
and, when acting in this interest, could permissibly infringe upon
freedoms of speech.63 The Court grounded this decision not so much in
the offensive content of child pornography but in its intrinsic relation to
the underlying, illegal sexual abuse that is necessary for its production.64 'Te advertising and selling of child pornography provide[s] an
economic motive for" its creation; thus, advertising and selling are

low value?" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
59. Id. at 761. The Court recognized that Miller did not reflect the State's compelling
interest in prosecuting people who sexually abused children. Id. Whether speech appealed
to an individual's prurient interest had no relation to whether a child was physically or
psychologically harmed by the production of the speech. Id. Further, the Court recognized
that it was possible for work to simultaneously have literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value and still be hardcore child pornography. Id. That the work had such value was
irrelevant to the juvenile victim. Id.
60. N.Y. PENAL LAW art. 263 (McKinney 2011).
61. Ferber,458 U.S. at 750-51. The jury acquitted Ferber of two counts of promoting
an obscene sexual performance under N.Y. PENAL LAw § 263.10 (McKinney 2011) but
convicted him on two counts of violating N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 1975)
(current version at N.Y PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 2011), which specifically addresses
child pornography. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751-52. At the time, the text of § 263.15 read: "A
person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when, knowing the character
and content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes
sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age." Id. at 751 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The statute was amended in 2000 to raise the child's age to seventeen
years. Sexual Assault Reform Act, § 21, 2000 N.Y. Laws 1, 6.
62. Ferber,458 U.S. at 751-52.
63. Id. at 756-58.
64. Id. at 759.
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integral to its manufacture.6 ' The Court agreed that law enforcement's
best chance of stopping the abuse was to "dry up" the market through
significant criminal sanctions on the speech itself.6
The Court in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition6 1 further underscored,
as a prerequisite to government regulation, the need for an integral
connection between speech and the abuse required for its production.
The Court in Ashcroft struck down portions of the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 (Act)" as unconstitutionally overbroad." In
addition to banning images made using actual children, the Act also
forbade what the court termed "virtual child pornography," images that
were computer-generated or that merely conveyed the impression that
the participant in the sexual act was a child.o The Court distinguished this from the ruling in Ferber,which was based upon how child
pornography was made, not what it communicated." Because virtual
child pornography is not "intrinsically related" to the sexual abuse of
children-recording no crime and creating no victims by its production-it
could not be outlawed purely because of its content.72
3. Free Speech and Overbreadth Analysis. When the Court
considers challenges to statutes that touch on constitutional issues, the
general rule is that a person accused of violating the statute cannot
contest its constitutionality based only on how it might affect other
people in other situations not before the Court." In the mid-1960s, the
Court began to recognize the development of a First Amendment

65. Id. at 761.
66. Id. at 760.
67. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
68. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26 (1996). At issue was the
portion of the Act that added 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8XA) (2006), which defines "child
pornography." Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 241.
69. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 256.
70. Id. at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court was not persuaded by the
content-based reasons Congress offered for regulating virtual child pornography that did
not involve actual children: that pedophiles might use the material to seduce children, to
"whet their own sexual appetites," and that it would be more difficult to detect pornography that used real children. Id. at 241-42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Id. at 250-51.
72. Id. at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973); see also United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17, 21(1960); New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160 (1907); Austin
v. Alderman, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 694, 698-99 (1868).
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exception to this principle.14 This exception enables an individual to
challenge a statute as overly broad even though he has not shown that
it violates his own speech rights because, theoretically, the statute's very
existence chills constitutionally protected speech that might be expressed
by those not before the court." Overbreadth analysis aims to balance
this potential chilling effect against the harm of throwing out a law that
in some of its applications is completely constitutional, particularly a law
that targets conduct so antisocial that it has been made criminal."
Over the years, the Court has consistently described the overbreadth
doctrine as a narrow exception-"strong medicine" to be used with
hesitation and after all other options have been exhausted." Facial
invalidation is proper only when the statute is substantially overbroad,
not just in an absolute sense but as judged against its "plainly legitimate
sweep."" Because this requires the Court to consider many more
applications of the statute than those that are immediately before it, the
lawfulness of the instant application ought to first be determined."
Further, the exception weakens when the behavior that the government
is forbidden to regulate "moves from 'pure speech' toward conduct and
that conduct-even if expressive-falls within the scope of otherwise valid
In Ferber, for example, the Court held that the
criminal laws."'
statute at issue was not overbroad."' The Court construed the law as
targeting hardcore child pornography and let the law stand knowing
that it would adversely affect some protected expression, including
medical textbooks, NationalGeographicpictorials, and other educational
or artistic works.82

74. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression, we have
not required that all of those subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to
test their rights. For free expression-of transcendent value to all society, and not
merely to those exercising their rights-might be the loser. For example, we have
consistently allowed attackes [sic] on overly broad statutes with no requirement
that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be
regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.
Id. (citation omitted).
75. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612.
76. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008).
77. Broadrick,413 U.S. at 613; see also Williams, 553 U.S. at 293; L.A. Police Dep't v.
United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999); Ferber,458 U.S. at 769.
78. Broadrick,413 U.S. at 615; see also Williams, 553 U.S. at 292 Bd. of Trs. v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469, 485 (1989); Ferber,458 U.S. at 770.
79. Fox, 492 U.S. at 485.
80. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
81. 458 U.S. at 773.
82. Id. at 773-74.

2011]

UNITED STATES V. STEVENS

1041

IV. THE CouRT's RATIONALE

A.

The Majority

The Court, with Chief Justice John Roberts writing for an 8-1
majority, structured its opinion around two key rulings: First, the Court
refused to add "depictions of animal cruelty" to the categories of speech
that are exempt from First Amendment' protection." Second, the
Court struck down 18 U.S.C. § 48a as "substantially overbroad" and
thus invalid under existing First Amendment doctrine."
As the Court considered the categorical exemption of depictions of
animal cruelty from the First Amendment, it described § 48 as presumptively invalid because the law explicitly regulated speech content."
The Court also acknowledged, however, that First Amendment jurisprudence had evolved to exclude a few narrowly defined categories of speech
from protection: obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech
integral to criminal conduct." Further, the Court accepted that animal
cruelty as an action in itself has been forbidden since the earliest
settlers arrived in the colonies.'
Even so, the Court found no known tradition forcing depictions of such
conduct outside of the First Amendment shelter." Moreover, the Court
utterly rejected the Government's argument that, rather than tradition,
the test for categorical exclusion of certain types of speech from First
Amendment protection should only require balancing the speech's value
against its societal costs.9 1 The Court viewed this test as "startling and
dangerous" and proclaimed free speech guarantees to extend farther
than merely those speech categories that survive an ad hoc balancing of
costs and benefits.92 Furthermore, the Court declared that the very
existence of the First Amendment reveals that the American people find
the benefits of restricting government regulation of speech to exceed the
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
84. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006), declared unconstitutionalby United States v. Stevens, 130
83.

S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
86. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 1584.
Id.
Id. at 1585.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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costs, and the Constitution bars any attempt to alter this judgment just
because some speech is not worth it."
The Court offered New York v. Ferber" as an example of when it
balanced the interests of child protection against the speech value of
child pornography yet actually decided the case based on the intrinsic
relation of the market for child pornography to the illegal, underlying
abuse." Thus, the Court explained, the analysis in Ferber was rooted
in a previously recognized and long-established category of unprotected
speech: that which is integral to criminal conduct.' The holding in
Ferberdid not create a "freewheeling" authority to exclude new speech
categories from the First Amendment." Further, even if there still
exist unidentified categories of historically unprotected speech, there is
no evidence that they include "depictions of animal cruelty."
Proceeding to the second part of the ruling, the Court invoked the
First Amendment overbreadth exception to hold § 48 unconstitutional on
its face." The Court first had to interpret the statute to determine
whether it was substantially overbroad, such that its unconstitutional
applications were too numerous relative to its legitimate applications.10 The Court read the law "to create a criminal prohibition of
Starting with the statute's text, which defined
alarming breadth."'
"depiction of animal cruelty" as any portrayal "in which a living animal
is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed,"102
the Court saw no requirement that the depicted conduct be cruel.10
Specifically, the terms "wounded" and "killed" did not convey cruelty;
thus, the Court rejected the Government's argument that an element of
cruelty should be read into the definitional terms based on both the
definiendum "depiction of animal cruelty" and the canon of noscitur a

93. Id. The Court acknowledged that in previous decisions, the Court described
traditionally unprotected categories of speech as having scant social value compared to the
evils that arise if the speech is not effectively regulated. Id. The Court emphasized,
however, that such descriptions are only that and are not meant to set a certain standard
or imply a general test for determining whether a category of speech should be protected.
Id. at 1586.
94. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
95. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. Id. at 1592.
100. Id. at 1587.
101. Id. at 1588.
102. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. § 48(cX1).
103. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1588.
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The Court ignored these interpretive doctrines by deciding

that "wounded" and "killed" were unambiguous terms whose ordinary
meaning did not require cruelty."os
The Court next declared § 48's requirement that the depicted conduct
be "illegal" as insufficient to properly limit its application.106 First, the
statute ignored the fact that many federal and state laws governing
animal treatment are not structured to prevent cruelty, making no
distinction as to why the intentional killing of an animal has been
outlawed.1o' Second, the Court saw the scope of § 48 as greatly
expanded by the fact that a depiction of conduct that is lawful in one
jurisdiction may wind up in a jurisdiction where such behavior is
unlawful.10 The Court thought this troublesome because even though
society may agree that animal cruelty is bad, there is significant debate
as to what behavior is "cruel," and even regulations not related to
cruelty differ from place to place.'09 For example, the Court suggested,
hunting is illegal in the District of Columbia, so hunting magazines and
videos showing the intentional killing of an animal could not be sold
legally in D.C. even though they have circulations in the millions and
vastly exceed the estimated demand for crush videos or depictions of dog
fights.no Additionally, § 48 allowed any jurisdiction to subject the rest
of the country to its laws, creating a "bewildering maze of regulations"
that makes compliance difficult."'
The Court held that the statute's exceptions clause did not effectively
narrow its reach either."' By using language from Miller v. Califor-

104. See id. When a word's meaning in a statute is unclear, the doctrine of noscitur
a sociis enables courts to craft a definition based on the word's relationship to other words
with which it is grouped, so that a more general word may be limited and qualified by
another word of similar meaning. NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 347-51 (7th ed. 2007). The Government also

relied on Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004). Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1588. There, the
Court gave meaning-and a heightened mens rea requirement-to the text of 18 U.S.C. § 16
(2006) based on the term which it defined, "crime of violence." Leocal, 543 U.S. at 3, 11
(internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1588.
106. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. The Court offered as examples laws that forbid the humane killing of certain
animals to protect endangered species, laws that regulate the slaughter of livestock for the
purpose of protecting human health, and laws that create hunting and fishing rules
designed to raise revenue, preserve animal populations, or prevent accidents. Id.
108.

Id. at 1589.

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1588-89.
Id. at 1590.
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nia"3 to remove from regulation only a few specific speech types that
had "serious . . . value,"'

the statute impermissibly set preconditions

for protecting certain speech in the first place.115 Nor was the Court
persuaded by the Government's claim that because the executive branch
interprets § 48 to reach only extreme cruelty, the Government will not
use the statute to prosecute something else.' The First Amendment
does not subject citizens to the mercy of prosecutorial discretion, and an
unconstitutional statute should not be left intact simply because the
Further, the Court
government promises to use it responsibly."
refused to invoke the constitutional avoidance canonne to rein in the
statute because the law was not "readily susceptible" to a limiting
It would have to be rewritten, not reinterpreted, and
construction.'
that would entail an unacceptable encroachment on the legislative
domain.2 o

113. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 48(b). The statute exempted "any depiction that has serious religious,
political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value." Id.
115. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1591. To save the statute, the Government hoped to define
"serious ... value" as anything more than "scant social value," but the Court declined to
do so, ruling that "serious should be taken seriously." Id. at 1590 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court interpreted the clause to require that the speech be "significant
and of great import" before it may escape regulation. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Plus, the Court noted there is much constitutionally protected speech that does
not fit squarely within one of the seven categories. Id. For example, hunting videos have
primarily entertainment value and are not necessarily instructional, and while the
Government offered depictions of Spanish bullfights as having historical value, the
Government did not explain why they would have inherent value and depictions of
Japanese dog fights would not. Id.
116. Id. at 1591.
117. Id. The Court noted that by prosecuting Stevens under § 48, the Government had
turned to a statute that President Clinton in his signing statement had announced would
apply "only [to] depictions of wanton cruelty to animals designed to appeal to a prurient
interest in sex." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To the Court, this indicated the
danger of putting faith in the Government's promise to practice prosecutorial restraint.
Id.
118. The constitutional avoidance canon says that statutes should be construed to avoid
unconstitutionality rather than discarded based on an interpretation that makes it
unconstitutional. SINGER & SINGER, suprm note 104, at 81. When a statute may
reasonably be interpreted in two ways-one that renders it unconstitutional and one that
does not-a court should apply the interpretation that maintains the law's constitutionality.
Id. at 81-83. Further, if a law is partly unconstitutional and partly not, the part that is
constitutional may be sustained unless the entire point of the law is made moot by
discarding the offensive portions. Id. at 89.
119. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1591-92 (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. Id. at 1592.
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In so construing § 48, the Court decided the constitutional question:
the statute was substantially overbroad and invalid under the First
Amendment.12 1 Notably, the Court did not determine whether a
statute specifically limited to crush videos or other depictions of extreme
12 2
animal cruelty would pass constitutional muster.
B.

Justice Alito's Dissent

Justice Samuel Alito's first disagreement with the Court was one of
standing, he suggested the Court remand the case back to the Third
Circuit to determine whether the statute was constitutional as specifically applied to Stevens." Though he acknowledged the First Amendment exception to overbreadth analysis, he described it as narrow.'"
He argued that an overbreadth challenge should not be allowed when
the contested statute is unconstitutional as applied to the challenger.125 Rather, the statute should first be assessed for validity as
applied to Stevens, and overbreadth should be a question only of last
resort. 126
Even if the overbreadth doctrine must be used, however, Justice Alito
asserted that § 48 did not proscribe a substantial amount of protected
speech." In declaring a statute substantially overbroad relative to its
plainly legitimate sweep, he argued the Court must use real-world
conduct rather than "fanciful hypotheticals."'28 He chastised the Court
for refusing to decide the constitutionality of § 48 as applied to two realworld depictions of animal cruelty-crush videos and dog fights-while
relying on depictions of hunting and slaughterhouse practices to
conclude that the statute reaches too much protected speech to
survive.12

121. Id. The Government, while arguing that crush videos and dog fights were
analogous to obscenity, and that the ban was narrowly tailored to aid restrictions on
underlying illegal conduct, had not defended the law beyond its application to crush videos
or animal fighting. Id. Further, the Court noted that the Government had not challenged
the notion that unconstitutional applications of § 48 outnumbered its permissible uses-that
the market for dogfight or crush videos was significantly smaller than the market for
legitimate depictions such as hunting magazines and videos. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1593 (Alito, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1593-94.
127. Id. at 1597.
128. Id. at 1594.
129. Id.
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For two reasons, Justice Alito found the Court's determination that

§ 48 applied to depictions of either hunting or slaughterhouse practices
"seriously flawed."' First, because the language of the statute should
be construed to avoid constitutional problems, and because § 48 targets
depictions of animal cruelty, the law should apply only to depictions
involving acts that state or federal law define as "animal cruelty" and
not to depictions of acts that are illegal for reasons entirely unrelated to
Second, such depictions should fall within the
animal cruelty.'
statute's exceptions clause as having "serious .. . scientific, educational,
or historical value."'32 Justice Alito also questioned the Court's
characterization of hunting: the activity is legal in all fifty states, and
Washington, D.C. is unique in its ban on the sport." Thus, hunting
depictions are legal under § 48 in nearly all jurisdictions." Plus, the
statute's legislative history revealed that Congress did not intend to
reach hunting depictions.a 5
Thus, Justice Alito declared that § 48 did not have many unconstitutional applications, either in the absolute sense or when judged against
its plainly legitimate sweep.'
He found, however, a number of
permissible uses."'
He thought it undisputed that the conduct
depicted in crush videos could be constitutionally prohibited."s
Because the videos are so closely linked to violent criminal conduct, and
because their restriction provides the sole avenue toward meaningful
prosecution, the First Amendment should not stand in the way.139
Justice Alito identified Ferberas the most relevant comparison, in which
the illegal sexual abuse underlying the production of child pornography,
and not its content, was targeted. 40 Like child pornography, he
reasoned, the conduct that crush videos and animal fight videos depict
is illegal and cannot be stopped without targeting the creation, sale, or
possession of such depictions.'"" Such videos show the commission of
violent criminal activity, are "produced as part of a low-profile,

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 1595.
Id. at 1595, 1597.
Id. at 1595 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1594-95.
Id. at 1595.
Id. at 1596.
Id. at 1597.
Id.
Id. at 1598.
Id. at 1598-99.
Id. at 1599 (quoting Ferber,458 U.S. at 759).
Id. at 1599-1600.
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clandestine industry," and are integral to commission of the crime
itself.4 2 While protecting children is more important than protecting
animals, the government still has a compelling interest in preventing
animals from being tortured." Furthermore, he argued, the harm
caused by the underlying crime vastly outweighs the content of the
speech.'"
Justice Alito ultimately concluded that § 48 is valid when applied to
crush videos and videos of animals fighting.4 s This gave the statute
a substantial core of constitutionally permissible applications." When
properly interpreted, he wrote, the statute did not ban a substantial
amount of protected speech. 47 For these reasons, Justice Alito rejected
the claim that § 48 was facially unconstitutional under the overbreadth
doctrine."
V. IMPLICATIONS

The most immediate and practical result of the Court's decision has
been a new proliferation of crush videos. Market regrowth began as
soon as 2008, following the Third Circuit's ruling. Shortly after that
decision, a Humane Society of the United States investigation found
crush videos once again "easily available for purchase" over the
Internet. 4 9 On one website, Humane Society investigators found for
sale more than one hundred videos of small animals being crushed,
burned, drowned, or impaled by hammer and nail.5 o These same
investigators found other websites which offered to sell them a dozen
crush videos featuring rabbits and nearly twenty videos featuring
mice."5 ' Similar videos remained online after Stevens' 52 was decided
and were being sold for about $80 via downloadable links. 53 Because

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 1601 (quoting Ferber,458 U.S. at 760) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1600.
Id. at 1600, 1602.
Id. at 1602.
Id.

147.
148.

Id.
Id.

149. Crush Videos Make a Comeback, THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES
(Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.humanesociety.org/news/news/2009/09/crushvideo_091509
.html.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
153. New Evidence Shows Animal Torture Videos Remain Available Online, HUMANE
SocIETY LEGISLATIVE FUND (July29,2010), http://www.hslf.org/press-releases/crush-video-
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of this resurgence, and in response to the Court's ruling in Stevens,
Congress passed in December 2010 the Animal Crush Video Prohibition
Act of 2010 (Act),'54 which is specifically tailored to crush videos.15 s
The Court-ordered destruction of former 18 U.S.C. § 48,156 however,
and the subsequent narrowing of the Act that replaced it, blunts what
would otherwise have been a potentially powerful tool for prosecuting
illegal animal fighting."' Integral to the success of these fights are
videos "memorializing" the action" because they document crucial
victories, generate revenue, are used as training guides, serve as
The ability to
marketing tools, and encourage gambling activity."
arrest those possessing or distributing such depictions would open an
avenue into an underground culture that otherwise is difficult for law
enforcement to penetrate. As Justice Alito observed, the comparison
between depictions of dogfights and depictions of children engaged in
sexual acts is hard to deny;16 0 in both cases, the speech supports a
market for and encourages the underlying criminal activity. By closing
a New York v. Ferberl61-like path to prosecution in the context of
animal cruelty, however, the Court has drawn a line between the
potential subjects of abuse. The Court declared a compelling government
interest in preventing the abuse of children but did not recognize such
interest in preventing the abuse of animals. While this analysis
probably did not weaken Ferber, it de-emphasized the link between
speech and underlying behavior and placed greater focus on the identity
of the victim. In doing so, even as the Court acknowledged an American
tradition of outlawing animal cruelty, it also undermined this tradition.
The Court's ruling could significantly limit the effect of future legislative
attempts to curtail animal cruelty if such regulations have to withstand

report.html.
154. Pub. L. No. 111-294, 124 Stat. 3177 (2010).
155. Id. The Act outlaws the creation or distribution of animal crush videos, which are
defined as any depiction of"actual conduct in which 1 or more living non-human mammals,
birds, reptiles, or amphibians is intentionally crushed, burned, drowned, suffocated,
impaled, or otherwise subjected to serious bodily injury . .. and . .. is obscene." Id. § 3.
156. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006), declared unconstitutionalby United States v. Stevens, 130
S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
157. All 50 states have general laws forbidding animal cruelty, and they all specifically
outlaw dog fighting. Brief for the United States at 25-27, Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (No. 08769), 2009 WL 1615365.
158. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Humane Society of the United States in Support of
Petitioner at 5, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 1681460.
159. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 158, at 9.
160. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1599 (Alito, J., dissenting).
161. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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strict scrutiny from the judiciary because they protect dogs rather than
children.
Yet in spite of some of the lamentable real-world consequences of
§ 48's destruction, Stevens displays unflinching support for First
Amendment 6 2 interests. The case reveals the current Court's development of a decidedly libertarian approach to content-based speech
regulation. Not only will government infringement in this area not be
tolerated, but it will not be tolerated even when the content of the
speech is inherently or historically of little value. Consider, for example,
that Stevens was decided only a few months after the Court in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission" dramatically altered its take
on corporate speech, a speech type that traditionally had occupied a low
rung of importance to society." The Court went out of its way to
reject existing precedent so that it could overturn government restric-

tions in this arena.16 5
Likewise, in Stevens the Court's resistance to government interference
with speech that many would find devoid of value is revealed by the
extent to which it reached to declare § 48 unconstitutional. By rejecting
the Government's balancing test for categorical exclusion," the Court
exposed a substantial distaste for removing newly-described types of
speech from First Amendment protection. The Court buttressed its
position with rather broad language, declaring that the Constitution
does not permit the conclusion that some speech is not worth protecting

162. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
163. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). Citizens United was decided in January of that year. Id.
164. Id. at 979 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated:
At bottom, the Court's opinion is ... a rejection of the common sense of the
American people, who have recognized a need to prevent corporations from
undermining self-government since the founding, and who have fought against the
distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electioneering since the days of
Theodore Roosevelt. It is a strange time to repudiate that common sense. While
American democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority of this Court would
have thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate money in politics.
Id.
165. See id. at 886. The Court overturned McConnell v. FederalElection Commission,
540 U.S. 93 (2003), and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990),
cases that had upheld federal statutory limits on "electioneering communication" under the
theory that political speech could be banned because of the speaker's corporate identity.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886 (internal quotation marks omitted). In holding that the
government may require disclaimers and disclosures on corporate speech but could no
longer suppress it, the Court declared that stare decisis no longer required it to follow the
reasoning it first laid down in Austin. Id.
166. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
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merely because its value is minimal. 6 7 This effectively closes the door
to just about any new categorical exemption of speech based solely on its
lack of value to society, and through Stevens the Court has cast doubt on
the idea that there still exist any categories of speech that may be
pushed outside First Amendment protection for this reason.
At best, removing low-value speech from First Amendment protection
will require that it somehow be linked to already exempted categories of
speech. Obscenity will not provide this link, as the Court in Stevens
made no movement to expand the doctrine's reach beyond speech that
possesses some sexual aspect. One does not have to make a large leap
to declare that the average person would find most depictions of animal
cruelty "patently offensive" in the plain meaning of the phrase. Yet
when that key element of prurient sexual interest is missing, the Court
has suggested that no matter how offensive the speech, it may not be
declared obscene. So even speech that communicates extreme violence,
but is entirely nonsexual in nature, is unlikely to be recognized as
obscene by the current Court.
Finally, the deliberateness with which the Court in Stevens selected
and ignored certain tools of statutory construction in interpreting § 48
further suggest the Court's bent toward speech deregulation. The Court
specifically bypassed an opportunity to save the statute by finding it
unconstitutional as applied only to the defendant Stevens.168 This
hints at a broader role for overbreadth analysis in future First Amendment cases. If no longer invoked as a last resort, the doctrine could
become the Court's device for chilling legislative attempts to regulate
speech. Similarly, it is significant that the Court deliberately rejected
common canons of statutory construction such as noscitur a sociis'69
and the constitutional avoidance doctrine.7 o With these tools, the
Court could have preserved § 48. Instead, the Court obliterated it.
J. MATTHEW BARNWELL

167. Id.
The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the
benefits ofits restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution
forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some
speech is not worth it. The Constitution is not a document "prescribing limits, and
declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure."
Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
168. See id. at 1587.
169. Id. at 1588.
170. Id. at 1595 (Alito, J., dissenting).

